














The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France 
 
 














William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 1047 
April 2013 
  
The efficiency and equity of the tax and transfer system in France 
Balázs Égert1 
Abstract 
Taxes and cash transfers reduce income inequality more in France than elsewhere in the OECD, because of 
the large size of the flows involved. But the system is complex overall. Its effectiveness could be enhanced 
in many ways, for example so as to achieve the same amount of redistribution at lower cost. The French 
tax code should be simplified and changed less frequently. High statutory rates are coupled with a wide 
range of effective tax rates resulting from a multitude of tax expenditures. There is a need for base 
broadening combined with lower rates throughout the system, including VAT. The tax wedge on labour is 
high, except at the bottom of the wage distribution, which can reduce worker participation and job offers. 
Greater neutrality both across different capital asset classes but also within specific taxes, and shifting 
taxes from labour and capital inputs to environmental and property taxes would improve economic 
outcomes. Likewise, the system of social and family benefits should be simplified to enhance transparency 
and consistency. Eliminating schemes that let people leave the labour market early, abolishing the pension 
privileges of specific occupational groups and internalising the costs of survivors’ pension benefits would 
increase fairness while at the same time generating savings. Better labour-market performance would result 
from increasing job-search incentives and shortening the parental leave allowance. This Working Paper 
relates to the 2013 OECD Economic Review of France (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/France). 
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Income inequality is relatively low, thanks to redistribution, and has been stable over time 
Inequality across French households’ pre-tax-and-transfer market income has been among the highest 
in the OECD, measured for instance by the Gini coefficient (Figure 1). This can be mostly explained by 
France’s low employment rate. The combination of low participation rates and high structural 
unemployment implies that an important fraction of the working-age population does not have any labour 
income. The dispersion in capital income (excluding imputed rents) plays a minor role in overall household 
market income dispersion: the contribution of capital income to income inequality in France is only about a 
quarter that of the average OECD country and is lower only in Central and Eastern European countries, 
Portugal and Korea (Hoeller et al., 2012; Koske et al., 2012). 
Figure 1. Income inequality, late 2000s 
Gini coefficients of household market and disposable income for working-age population 
Per consumer unit 
 
1. Before taxes and transfers. 
2. After taxes and transfers. 
Source: OECD, Income Distribution and Poverty database. 
Given the large size of the overall system, taxes and cash transfers reduce income inequality more in 
France than in most OECD countries (see annex 1). The Gini coefficient drops by around 14 percentage 
points after taxes and cash transfers are taken into account, whereas this decline is only 10 points in an 
average OECD country (see Figure 13 in the Assessment & Recommendations). The sizable income 
redistribution reduces households’ observed market income inequality from well above the OECD average 
to below it. The French statistical office, INSEE, estimates that, considering income that already 
incorporates pensions and unemployment benefits, which are largely insurance-based benefits, cash 
transfers account for two thirds of redistribution and taxes for the remaining third (Duval et al., 2012). 
Transfers related to family and housing and those aimed at maintaining a minimum income level represent 
90% of redistribution effected by cash transfers. Sixty per cent of the redistribution generated by taxes 
comes from the personal income tax. Recent government measures, including a new top tax bracket and 
the integration of capital income into the personal income tax schedule, will increase the overall 
progressivity of the tax system. 
 
France is one of the very few OECD countries where income inequality after taxes and transfers 
across households remained stable between 1985 and 2010. But behind this development lies a U-shaped 
evolution: after a drop until the mid-1990s, income inequality started to rise slowly during the 2000s. 
According to Cazenave et al. (2011), cuts in the personal income tax and the indexation of cash transfers to 
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inflation (rather than to wage growth, for example) slightly reduced the progressivity of the tax and transfer 
system and were only partially offset by the introduction of the CSG (generalised social contribution) and 
the increase in the progressivity of the local residence tax (taxe d’habitation). As a result of booming asset 
prices, the income share of households in the top decile of the income distribution almost doubled from the 
mid-1990s to the late 2000s. 
Wealth inequality was twice as high as inequality of household disposable income in 2009 and 
increased between 2004 and 2010 (Chaput et al., 2011). The interaction between wealth concentration and 
capital incomes is likely to accentuate income inequality in the longer run. A large and increasing share of 
extremely high income earners, partly due to business income being taxed increasingly as personal income 
to avoid double taxation of corporate income, is the main reason for rising income inequality in the 
United States and other OECD countries (Figure 2). In France, however, the income share of the top 1% 
and 0.1% of all earners is, respectively, only half and a third of that in the United States for instance, and 
these shares have risen only moderately since the mid-1990s. 
In-kind benefits provided through government services reduce France’s Gini coefficient, which 
measures income inequality, by about six percentage points, slightly less than the OECD average 
(OECD, 2011a) (Figure 3, Panel A). Health care and education services are the most effective in-kind 
benefits for lowering income inequality among French households (Figure 3, Panel B). The effectiveness 
of social housing, early childhood education and care (ECEC) and long-term care in decreasing income 
inequalities is, in contrast, rather limited. 
Figure 2. The level and evolution of the share of top income earners in total income 
 
Source: The World Top Incomes Database, http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes. 
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Figure 3. The impact of in-kind benefits on income inequality, late 2000s 
Percentage point change in the Gini coefficient 
 
1. ECEC and LTC stand for early childhood care centre and long-term care, respectively. 
2. Averages by category are computed across available data. 
Source: OECD, Divided We Stand, 2011.  
Much of the redistribution is achieved by the considerable volume of public spending, financed by a 
high level of taxes, which can weigh on economic performance. By tackling the sources and causes of 
household market income inequality, the government could more efficiently achieve the same level of 
inequality. It would be preferable to make changes to certain measures so as to reduce market income 
dispersion and thus the need for explicit redistribution and by better targeting. Then public spending and 
taxes could be diminished. 
A recent OECD study identifies a number of policies that would help reduce income inequality in 
general (Koske et al., 2012). The ones that might be relevant for France are as follows: i) making access to 
education effectively equal and lessening the link from socio-economic background to educational 
outcomes; ii) elimination of labour-market dualism; iii) increased spending on active labour market 
policies; iv) better integration of immigrants (OECD, 2012a); and v) reduction of gender discrimination by 
increasing female labour market integration and lowering the gender wage gap. Also, continuing wage 
restraint at the minimum wage level would be beneficial because high minimum wages tend to increase 
rather than reduce income inequality and poverty by pricing low-skilled workers out of the labour market 
(Cahuc et al., 2008). The minimum wage in France (the SMIC) is very binding: it applies equally to all 
sectors and regions, and, even if only 10.6% of all employees are paid the SMIC, the wages of about 35% 
of workers depend directly or indirectly on its evolution. 
The French tax system is complex, changes frequently and induces serious distortions 
The French tax system is very complicated: there exist a large number of taxes and levies 
accompanied by a multitude of tax credits and exemptions. Tax provisions change frequently. This is 
burdensome, since, in order for a tax system not to penalise economic activity excessively, three guiding 
principles must be borne in mind: stability, neutrality and simplicity (Mirrlees Review, 2011). A neutral 
tax system does not interfere with household consumption decisions, nor influences the form of income 
received, the types of savings chosen, investment decisions nor whether current income is consumed now 
or in the future. The French tax system contains a large number of non-neutralities, which have important 
implications for employment, investment, saving and consumption decisions. Non-neutralities within asset 
classes arise mainly from numerous tax expenditures, which imply higher statutory rates and a very wide 
range of effective tax rates. Moving toward neutrality would also reduce complexity. Greater neutrality and 
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simplicity would in turn reduce opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance and reduce administrative and 
compliance costs. 
Stability is also desirable to minimise administrative and compliance costs and to reduce the negative 
effect of policy uncertainty on investment and saving decisions. Tax changes are reflected in asset prices 
and may create volatility and hence uncertainty regarding valuations. If changes are needed, they should be 
decided in a transparent framework and in line with a long-term strategy. However, non-neutrality is 
desirable in the presence of externalities, such as environmental pollution or positive spill-over effects 
from innovation. In addition to efficiency, redistribution is also central to any tax system. Nevertheless, 
there may be trade-offs between efficiency and redistribution: a more efficient system may do less to 
reduce income inequalities, and greater redistribution may harm incentives to work, save and invest. 
The taxation of labour is heavy despite substantial targeted measures 
Different parts of the working-age population are likely to respond differently to tax changes. 
Labour-supply responses for (unskilled) low-income workers, single parents, second earners (usually 
women) with dependent children and seniors are highly sensitive to the level of taxation. Studies show that 
low-skilled workers react at the extensive margin rather than at the intensive margin, i.e. they react more in 
terms of either taking a job or not than in terms of the number of hours worked (OECD, 2011b). Taxation 
can also alter geographic location choices for mobile workers, often highly skilled. French tax policies 
strengthen work incentives to low-income workers. Yet, while close to the European average, the 
employment rate of women with low educational attainment is fairly low in the absolute and in comparison 
with the best-performing countries (Figure 4). 
A high tax wedge on earnings of low-income workers, in particular if coupled with a high minimum 
wage such as observed in France, curbs labour demand. Consecutive French governments have lowered 
employer social security contributions (SSCs) for very low-income earners since 1993. Since 2007, a relief 
of 26 percentage points (28.1 for firms with less than 20 employees) has been applied to those on minimum 
wages, with the relief linearly decreasing to zero for those earning 1.6 times the SMIC. Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that reduced SSCs may have created or maintained between 600 000 and 1 100 000 jobs 
between 1998 and 2009, without causing low-income traps (Ourliac and Nouveau, 2012). 
Nevertheless, as reduced social security contributions are phased out, the marginal (but also the 
average) tax wedge becomes very high, especially for the unmarried and single parents (Table 1), which 
may reduce the supply of labour of those at those wage levels. The government’s competitiveness pact, 
which reduces the tax wedge by six percentage points up to 2.5 times the SMIC, is a welcome measure, 
even though the abrupt removal of the reduction would result in a wage trap around that threshold. 
The overall tax burden comes not only from taxes and SSCs but also from the withdrawal of benefits 
upon entering the labour market (losing unemployment or social benefits) or working more hours (losing 
means-tested benefits). Benefit withdrawal can create sharp increases in marginal effective tax rates 
(METRs). However, there is a trade-off: a more gradual cut-off of benefits could reduce such threshold 
effects, but doing so is more costly. That cost could be financed either by higher taxes, which may reduce 
the labour supply of other workers, or via lower benefits, which would hurt the poor (OECD, 2011b). 
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Figure 4. Employment rates, 2010  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
The OECD’s Tax-Benefit models show that French METRs never exceed 100% (Table 2). However, 
groups that are more sensitive to marginal rates (low-wage workers and single parents) do not face lower 
METRs than others. For the transition from unemployment benefits to full-time work, the METR is about 
80%, independent of family composition. Such a high rate is problematic, given the combination of long 
unemployment benefit duration (two to three years) without degressivity and poor activation policies. 
Unemployment benefit withdrawal accounts for two-thirds and income taxes and employees’ SSCs for one 
third of the high marginal rate. In-work tax credits play only a minor role in offsetting these factors. 
METRs are somewhat lower for moving from social assistance to a job. At the intensive margin, the 





Table 1. Tax wedge in % of labour costs for different wage levels and household types, 2011 
Single Married couple 
No children Two children No children Two children 









Belgium 66.3 49.7 United Kingdom 76.3 7.1 Belgium 66.3 48 Belgium 66.3 41.4 
France 63.2 46.5 Ireland 67.9 -24.6 Hungary 63.5 46.7 Hungary 63.5 34.3 
Austria 56.9 43.7 Belgium 66.3 35.5 Austria 60.6 44.7 Austria 60.6 37.2 
Germany 56.0 45.6 Canada 60.5 -6.3 Finland 57.2 39.3 Israel 60.3 12.2 
Italy 54.0 44.5 Australia 58.0 -6.0 Germany 56.0 45.6 Finland 57.2 35.5 
Finland 53.1 37.2 France 57.7 38.4 Italy 54.1 44.5 Germany 55.7 38.9 
Hungary 51.6 45.2 Austria 56.9 26.8 France 51.3 45.6 Italy 55.1 40.3 
Portugal 50.7 33.1 Czech Republic 55.7 16.4 Norway 51.2 35.0 Czech Republic 54.0 30.7 
Netherlands 48.7 33.1 Italy 54.5 29 Slovenia 51.0 40.2 Norway 51.2 31.9 
Czech Rep. 48.6 39.5 Germany 54.2 31.2 Portugal 50.7 34.0 Portugal 50.7 30.4 
Sweden 45.6 40.7 Finland 53.1 26.4 Czech Republic 48.6 40.3 New Zealand 50.0 7.0 
Spain 45.2 36.6 Spain 52.4 29.5 Spain 48.1 36.9 Spain 48.1 35.8 
Slovak Republic 44.4 36.1 Netherlands 51.7 11.5 Sweden 47.9 41.0 Sweden 47.9 36.9 
Slovenia 43.6 38.6 United States 51.4 8.2 Netherlands 47.0 33.8 Iceland 47.9 27.6 
Iceland 43.5 29.2 Portugal 50.7 23.7 Slovak Republic 44.4 35.8 Netherlands 47.0 29.2 
Norway 43.2 34.2 Iceland 50.6 18.5 Iceland 43.5 29.5 France 46.9 40.0 
Estonia 42.9 38.8 Sweden 45.6 32.5 OECD 42.9 32.2 Canada 44.5 23.8 
Luxembourg 42.5 29.2 Slovak Republic 44.4 23.6 Estonia 42.9 38.8 Slovak Republic 44.4 29.5 
Turkey 42.2 35.4 OECD 43.8 15.6 Denmark 42.3 37.0 OECD 44.1 27.2 
Denmark 40.9 36.8 Norway 43.2 21.4 Turkey 42.2 37.9 Slovenia 43.6 30.6 
OECD 40.9 31.6 Estonia 42.9 24.3 Luxembourg 40.9 27.7 Estonia 42.9 34.2 
United Kingdom 40.2 28.5 Luxembourg 42.5 2.4 Canada 40.8 27.7 Denmark 42.3 32.1 
Australia 39.1 20.6 Turkey 42.2 34.2 United Kingdom 40.2 28.5 Turkey 42.2 37.3 
Ireland 37.7 21.3 Denmark 40.9 11.4 Israel 38.6 16.6 Luxembourg 40.9 17.7 
Poland 36.1 33.4 Hungary 35.8 20 Ireland 37.7 20.3 United Kingdom 40.2 25.0 
Canada 33.5 26.1 Slovenia 32.9 12.7 Poland 36.1 33.4 Ireland 37.7 13.3 
United States 32.5 27.2 Japan 31.6 19.7 Japan 35.8 30.0 Poland 36.1 29.6 
Japan 31.6 29.5 Poland 28.4 28.4 Australia 35.4 22.9 Japan 35.8 25.1 
Israel 30.0 13.0 Switzerland 18.7 2.8 United States 32.5 27.8 Australia 35.4 17.9 
Switzerland 23.0 18.0 Korea 18.6 17.0 New Zealand 30.0 14.8 United States 32.5 22.7 
Korea 19.8 17.7 New Zealand 17.5 -18.7 Korea 28.8 19.4 Korea 25.1 17.9 
New Zealand 17.5 12.9 Mexico 17.5 13.2 Switzerland 26.0 18.6 Switzerland 23.6 11.1 
Mexico 17.5 13.2 Israel 16.8 0.1 Mexico 18.7 14.4 Mexico 18.7 14.4 
Chile 7.0 7.0 Chile 7.0 6.0 Chile 7.0 7.0 Chile 7.0 4.9 
Note: MARG and AVE denote the marginal and average tax wedge, respectively. 
Source: OECD, Taxing Wages, http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/taxingwages.htm 
Two important instruments are in place to reduce the impact of benefit withdrawals on the implicit 
marginal tax rate of low-income households. The first is a refundable, in-work tax credit (prime pour 
l’emploi, PPE), a tax credit for low-income workers created in 2001. The second is embedded in a more 
general programme targeted at poverty reduction, the active solidarity income (revenu de solidarité active, 
RSA). RSA has a component, the activity RSA, which provides a bonus to those who have modest revenue 
from labour earnings. The PPE and activity RSA are complementary: activity RSA tops up basic social 
transfers and earnings to enhance incentives to work, to which PPE is added at higher but still modest 
levels of income (Figure 5). 
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Table 2. Marginal effective tax rates (%), 2010 
Family situation 
Extensive margin Intensive margin 
From unemployment 
benefit to full-time job 
From social assistance 
 to full-time job 
From part-time 
to full-time 
33% of average wage level 50% => 100% 
No children Single person 87 67 36 
 One-earner married couple 86 62 44 
 Two-earner married couple 88 15 35 
Two children Lone parent 86 55 47 
 One-earner married couple 85 56 55 
 Two-earner married couple 87 31 34 
  67% of average wage level 33% => 100% 
No children Single person 77 55 50 
 One-earner married couple 72 57 60 
 Two-earner married couple 76 27 38 
Two children Lone parent 72 61 75 
 One-earner married couple 72 61 75 
 Two-earner married couple 75 33 30 
  100% of average wage level 67% => 100% 
No children Single person 76 48 32 
 One-earner married couple 75 50 39 
 Two-earner married couple 76 28 32 
Two children Lone parent 73 55 37 
 One-earner married couple 73 57 50 
 Two-earner married couple 75 32 31 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit models, http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm  
Figure 5. Simplified depiction of the RSA 
 
Source: Bourgeois and Tavan (2009). 
But activity RSA and PPE are not fully consistent with each other. RSA is paid on a monthly basis 
based on the previous quarter’s earnings, while PPE is deducted from taxes paid a year after labour income 
is earned. Whether someone is eligible for activity RSA depends on household revenue. By contrast, the 
basis for means-testing PPE is individual income (Bonnefoy et al., 2009), with a ceiling on total household 
income. A recent evaluation of activity RSA shows that almost 70% of individuals who would be eligible 
for activity RSA do not claim it. A major reason for this is lack of information regarding RSA eligibility 
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(Bourguignon, 2011). Against this backdrop, the government should streamline and simplify the current 
system by merging activity RSA and PPE and by paying the income support on a monthly basis using 
immediately previous earnings to maximise the incentive effects on labour supply. The government 
announced in its multi-year plan against poverty a better harmonisation between the RSA and the PPE. 
Joint family income taxation may discourage female labour force participation 
Joint family taxation is compulsory in France: the tax burden depends on income declared in the joint 
tax declaration, divided by the part, which is two for a childless couple. The main argument for family 
taxation is that of horizontal equity: equal tax rates for equal pre-tax standards of living (“à niveau de vie 
égal, taux d'imposition égal”). The presence of a second adult does not double living costs, however, 
because of scale effects, and therefore a weight of two favours couples. Furthermore, family taxation 
favours couples with very different earnings relative to individual taxation. French income taxation also 
accounts for the number of children, as discussed below. 
A major drawback of the joint taxation of spouses or partners is that it can create work disincentives 
for second earners, usually women, especially if the first earner falls in a higher tax bracket and that the 
number of part is too high: a second earner entering the labour force is taxed at a higher marginal rate than 
a single individual would be. For this reason, many OECD countries have opted for individual taxation 
(OECD, 2011d). In France, the average tax wedge, computed based on the gross wage minus employee 
SSCs and personal income tax (including CSG), is about 5 percentage points higher for a second earner 
without children than for a single earner. The gap widens to 10 percentage points in the presence of two 
children (OECD, 2011d). The effective marginal and average tax rates on second earners are likely to be 
considerably higher if cash transfers and in-kind benefits received on a family basis are also taken into 
accounted. Carbonnier (2007)’s findings would suggest that even if the overall impact on the female 
participation rate is limited, for certain categories of women – including those who are childless, have 
children older than three years or whose spouses earn between 2.5 and 4 times the SMIC – it reacts more 
strongly to incentives. On a sample of OECD countries, Jaumotte (2003) shows that joint taxation reduces 
the participation rate of women significantly. The government should encourage female labour force 
participation by moving to individual-based personal income taxation. 
Incentives for older workers to keep working can be further improved 
There is an asymmetry in the treatment of earnings and pensions with regard to SSCs, which may 
provide disincentives to work longer. Pension income enjoys reduced rates for the CSG (6.6% instead of 
7.5% for employees) or even zero rates below a certain threshold, costing the budget about 0.35% of GDP 
(Cour des Comptes, 2012). In addition, pensioners are not subject to SSCs relating to health care. 
Eliminating this asymmetric treatment would help reduce, in a budget-neutral way, the tax wedge on 
labour income. At the same time, workers above the statutory retirement age, in particular if they receive 
pensions simultaneously, should pay only SSCs applying to current pensioners, such as for health care. 
Pensioners also receive favourable tax treatment (compared to the active population) on local taxes: 
below a certain income threshold they are entitled to full or partial exoneration from recurrent property 
taxes (taxe d’habitation and taxe foncière) and capital gains tax on property sales. Such tax breaks overlap 
with (though the income brackets are slightly different) and complement the main instrument to counter 
old-age poverty: the minimum pension (allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées). While the 10% 
reduction of the personal income tax base (which is capped) to which every wage earner is entitled is 
viewed as a lump-sum proxy for work-related costs, the similar reduction from pension income, even with 
a much lower upper ceiling for the absolute deduction, is more difficult to justify. In addition, pensioners 
can take advantage of a flat amount tax reduction below a certain income threshold (about 23 000 euros in 
2012), and pensioners who had three children do not have to pay tax on the 10% pension premium for 
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children. These tax reductions and exemptions are strongly regressive and amount to about 0.3% of GDP 
(Cour des Comptes, 2012). The government should simplify the current system of minimum pensions, 
eliminate pensioners’ tax breaks, discontinue the 10% tax reduction for pension income and, if needed, 
increase the minimum pension (which, however, was almost twice the amount of social assistance (basic 
RSA) for a single person in 2012). 
The so-called surcote (bonus) ensures an increase of 5% in annual pension benefits, a figure close to 
actuarial neutrality, by working an extra year beyond the period required for a full pension. But a number 
of useful measures encourage older people to work longer. People at pension age are allowed to work 
while receiving pensions (cumul employ-retraite), and it is also possible to retire only partially while 
continuing to work part-time (retraite progressive). Finally, employers cannot lay off individuals wishing 
to work until the age of 69. But unemployed people over 50 can receive unemployment benefits for up to 
three years rather than the standard two years (which may be extended substantially by long-term 
unemployment benefits (allocation de solidarité spécifique, ASS and allocation équivalent retraite, 
AER)). This constitutes an implicit early retirement scheme and as such should be abolished as discussed 
below in more detail. In June 2012, the government decided to lower the minimum retirement age to 60 for 
persons who by that age had contributed the length of time required for a full pension. The absence of a 
bonus for quarterly contributions beyond the contribution period required for a full pension and prior to the 
legal minimum age (62) discourages those eligible for early retirement on long-career grounds from 
continuing to work. It would therefore be advisable to change the rules for the bonus so that quarterly 
contributions beyond the legal duration required for a full-rate pension would increase the amount of the 
pension. 
The mobility of high-income earners will limit the revenue yield of raising the top marginal tax rate 
In theory, top incomes may react to higher marginal rates through three channels: i) reduced labour 
supply, ii) tax avoidance through income shifting due to tax loopholes that narrow the tax base, and iii) the 
power of top executives to influence firms’ compensation committees. Prerequisites to increase top rates 
with no loss in tax revenues are in fact a broad tax base with few loopholes and little opportunity for tax 
arbitrage. The government capped tax expenditures on personal income tax at 10 000 euros per taxpayer, 
though some tax expenditures are not concerned by this limit, which is an attempt to close the tax-arbitrage 
channel. The only unavoidable factor that limits the size of the revenue-maximising top marginal rate is the 
labour-supply elasticity. Piketty et al. (2011) show for a panel of 18 OECD countries that the labour supply 
of high income earners has a low elasticity. In the case of the United States, Saez et al. (2012) show that 
once the possibilities for tax arbitrage have been eliminated, the labour supply of high income earners is 
affected little by tax increases. According to these studies, top marginal tax rates higher than those 
observed in many countries may be optimal. However, they do not factor in the possibility of migration to 
countries with lower top marginal tax rates. In fact, while there is little direct empirical evidence on the 
migration of top income earners as a function of changes in taxation, empirical evidence on the 
international migration of football superstars in Europe shows that migration decisions depend to a large 
extent on changes in top income tax rates (Kleven et al., 2010). 
The government has added a new bracket of 45% (in addition to the existing 41% bracket) for 
earnings exceeding 150 000 euros per individual share of household income (part fiscale). The Mirrlees 
Review (2011) suggested that the revenue-maximising top marginal rate, including SSCs, should be around 
50 to 60%. Employers’ and employees’ SSCs combined with the proposed top rate of 45% imply a 
marginal rate of about 62 to 65%. For individual income in excess of 1 million euros, a temporary bracket 
of 75% (including the CSG of 8%) was legislated for 2012 and 2013, generating predicted tax revenues of 
0.02% of GDP. Such hikes are meant to increase tax progressivity, and the marginal rate of 75% was 
presented as a political symbol of fiscal justice. But the Constitutional Court invalidated the 75% bracket 
because it applied to individuals’ revenues and not to family income, violating the principle of equal 
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sharing of the tax burden because households with the same revenue may be taxed differently depending 
on the composition of individual labour and capital income. Increasing tax rates to 75% would be 
counterproductive if it results in lower revenues. The top marginal rate of 75% would result in an effective 
top marginal rate of 79%. On the one hand, the work of Piketty et al. (2011) and Saez et al. (2012) suggests 
that the optimal top marginal rates could be higher than the current rates. On the other hand, according to 
Simula and Trannoy (2009), in a model calibrated to French data, the previous 40% top rate might already 
have been too high to prevent emigration and tax-base erosion. These authors even argue that 
revenue-maximising top marginal rates could be below the rates applied at lower income levels, for which 
the propensity to emigrate is low. Generally speaking, a tax base narrowed by numerous tax expenditures, 
coupled with high marginal tax rates is not best practice: rather a broad tax base and lower marginal tax 
rates are preferred. 
The taxation of capital 
Effective marginal tax rates on capital income vary substantially 
Taxes applied to capital income of individuals and corporations are one type of capital taxation. While 
certain economic modelling setups would predict that capital income should not be taxed at all (Atkinson 
and Stiglitz, 1976), taxing capital at non-zero rates can be desirable for a number of reasons. First, the most 
highly productive individuals have a higher capacity to pay taxes: they tend to save more and to obtain 
higher yields on their savings. Second, capital income taxes can be viewed as a tax on bequests spread over 
someone’s lifetime. Third, taxing capital income can encourage individuals to invest in human rather than 
financial capital. Lastly, constituting precautionary savings in order to protect oneself against permanent 
negative shocks can create disincentives to work if these shocks do not materialise (Denk, 2012). An 
important practical concern is to avoid tax arbitrage from labour to capital income for small businesses and 
the self-employed. At the same time, high taxes on capital income often imply double taxation of labour 
income, given that the primary source of savings is labour earnings. High taxes could also encourage 
taxpayers to move capital out of the country in a context of high capital mobility (Denk, 2012). 
The government’s recent decision to phase out the dual income tax system through integrating capital 
income into the personal income tax schedule may increase considerably the tax burden for those falling 
into the upper tax brackets (top marginal rate of 45% and social levies of 15.5%) compared to the previous, 
already high flat tax rate of close to 40% (21% for dividends and 24% for interest income plus social levies 
of 15.5%). Capital gains (excluding one’s primary residence) are also henceforth integrated into the PIT 
schedule. Dividends are subject to multiple taxation: corporate tax, the 3% dividends tax (at the corporate 
level) adopted in July 2012, income tax (though with a 40% exclusion, which limits double taxation) and 
social levies. This implies a much higher effective tax rate on dividends than before and compared to that 
on interest-bearing assets. Double taxation of dividends is avoided or to a large extent attenuated in 
Canada, Chile, Mexico and New Zealand (Ernst &Young, 2011) by accounting for corporate income taxes 
in calculating personal taxes due on dividends. The French government should reduce the extent of 
multiple taxation of dividends. 
At the same time, a number of savings vehicles benefit from preferential tax conditions, even though 
some of these tax expenditures were scaled back in 2012. Gains stemming from share savings plans (plan 
d’épargne en actions, PEA) are exempt from income tax (but not from CSG) if assets are withdrawn after 
five years. Workers’ voluntary savings plans at the company level (plan d’épargne salariale) also enjoy 
tax breaks and are subject to reduced SSCs. Income from savings in the form of life insurance is taxed only 
when capital is withdrawn and at lower rates after eight years of possession. Finally, a number of savings 
deposits (livret A, livret d'épargne-populaire, livret d'épargne-logement, plan d’épargne-logement, livret 
jeune, livret d'épargne-entreprise, livret de développement durable) are exempt from tax and in some cases 
not subject to social levies. The recent increase in the ceilings of livret A and livret de développement 
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durable accentuates the existing distortions. There is therefore a general need for reforming the taxation of 
savings by applying similar tax treatment to all products. 
The absence of neutrality for investment in housing is also an important issue: taxing income from 
renting real estate but not imputed rents encourages home ownership, as the previous Survey argued 
(OECD, 2011e). The standard deviation of effective tax rates (and thus the divergence from neutrality 
across asset classes – interest, dividends, rental and owner-occupied housing) was already large prior to the 
integration of capital revenues and gains into the PIT schedule in 2013 (Figure 6, Panel A). A related issue 
is the treatment of capital gains, which should be subject to the same tax across different assets, and all 
gains should be deemed to have been realised at death. 
Figure 6. The dispersion of top marginal effective tax rates across different asset classes, 20111 
 
1. Underlying the calculations are the top marginal effective tax rates of the four asset classes presented in Table 3 based on a 
nominal return of 4% and an inflation rate of 2%. 
Source: OECD calculations based on Table 3, displayed below. 
Inflation affects the effective tax rate on capital income, if the tax base is nominal income. A high 
statutory tax rate on the nominal return may imply a very high effective tax rate on the real return, 
especially if inflation is high and/or the real return is low. In an extreme case, taxing the nominal rate could 
even lower the real value of the capital stock. These effects would be eliminated by basing taxation of 
capital income and gains on real, not nominal returns, notwithstanding the technical problems this might 
pose. To date, most countries, including France, tax the nominal rather than real return on capital. 
However, in Israel and Luxembourg, capital gains taxes are levied on the increase in the inflation-adjusted 
value of secondary residences, while a special construction-sector price index is applied in Portugal to 
calculate real capital gains. Capital gains, a form of capital income, should be taxed similarly to other 
capital income. 
As a result of taxing nominal rather than real returns, METRs, calculated assuming a nominal return 
of 4% and an inflation rate of 2%, can be very high, even above 100%, implying a depreciation of the real 
stock of capital. Table 3 shows that, for assets not benefiting from the numerous tax breaks discussed 
earlier, France is among the countries with the highest METRS: about 80% for income from 




Table 3. Effective top marginal tax rates on real returns of different asset classes, 2011  
Per cent 
 Nominal return=4%, inflation=2% Nominal return=8%, inflation=2% 







Australia 90% 93% 0% 90% 60% 62% 0% 60% 
Austria 50% 88% 0% 100% 33% 58% 0% 67% 
Belgium 30% 88% 0% 100% 20% 59% 0% 67% 
Canada 50% 96% 0% 58% 33% 64% 0% 39% 
Chile 70% 80% 0% 80% 47% 53% 0% 53% 
Czech Republic  30% 62% 0% 30% 20% 42% 0% 20% 
Denmark 50% 113% 0% 103% 33% 75% 0% 69% 
Estonia 42% 42% 0% 42% 28% 28% 0% 28% 
Finland 56% 81% 0% 60% 37% 54% 0% 40% 
France 2011 79% 115% 0% 113% 53% 77% 0% 75% 
with wealth tax 169% 205% 63% 203% 83% 107% 21% 105% 
France 2013 121% 148% 0% 121% 81% 99% 0% 81% 
with wealth tax 196% 223% 53% 196% 106% 124% 17% 106% 
Germany 50% 97% 0% 90% 33% 65% 0% 60% 
Greece 20% 80% 0% 90% 13% 53% 0% 60% 
Hungary  32% 64% 0% 32% 21% 43% 0% 21% 
Iceland 20% 72% 0% 64% 13% 48% 0% 42% 
with wealth tax 95% 147% 75% 139% 38% 73% 25% 67% 
Ireland 60% 97% 0% 82% 40% 64% 0% 55% 
Israel 50% 78% 0% 90% 33% 52% 0% 60% 
Italy 40% 73% 0% 86% 27% 49% 0% 57% 
Japan 40% 103% 0% 80% 27% 69% 0% 53% 
Korea 40% 96% 0% 70% 27% 64% 0% 47% 
Luxembourg 20% 79% 0% 76% 13% 52% 0% 51% 
Mexico 40% 60% 0% 35% 27% 40% 0% 23% 
Netherlands 60% 88% 0% 104% 40% 58% 0% 69% 
New Zealand 56% 56% 0% 71% 37% 37% 0% 47% 
Norway 56% 96% 0% 56% 37% 64% 0% 37% 
 with wealth tax 111% 151% 14% 78% 56% 83% 5% 45% 
Poland 38% 69% 0% 64% 25% 46% 0% 43% 
Portugal 43% 85% 0% 92% 29% 56% 0% 61% 
Slovak Republic 38% 38% 0% 38% 25% 25% 0% 25% 
Slovenia 40% 72% 0% 82% 27% 48% 0% 55% 
Spain 42% 89% 0% 54% 28% 60% 0% 36% 
Sweden 60% 97% 0% 122% 40% 65% 0% 81% 
Switzerland 70% 74% 0% 96% 47% 49% 0% 64% 
 with wealth tax 145% 149% 75% 171% 72% 74% 25% 89% 
Turkey 30% 64% 0% 40% 20% 43% 0% 27% 
United Kingdom 40% 105% 0% 100% 27% 70% 0% 67% 
United States 60% 90% 0% 70% 40% 60% 0% 47% 
Note: Returns are assumed to be realised through capital income and not through capital gains and that the top marginal rate 
of the income tax schedule is applied unless there is a withholding tax or if no taxes apply at the personal level. Tax breaks 
on various asset types are not taken into account. The effective tax rate on dividends includes corporate and personal income 
taxes and social security contributions. For owner-occupied housing, local property taxes are not included. France’s effective 
tax rate on owner-occupied housing accounts for the fact that only 70% of the value of the property enters the tax base. The 
PIT marginal rates of 41% (2011) and 45% (2013) are used for France.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
The prevailing statutory rate of the corporate income tax of 34.4% (base rate of 33.33%, multiplied by 
1.0333 to account for social contributions) is among the highest in the OECD, even though it was cut by 
around five percentage points over the last two decades. Only Japan and the United States have higher 
statutory corporate income tax rates (Figure 7). The rate rises to 36.1% if one adds the exceptional 5% tax 
for big companies with an annual turnover in excess of 250 million euros for 2012 and 2013. For an open 
economy with free capital movements, the level of corporate income taxes is an important factor 
determining a country’s attractiveness for foreign investors and its international competitiveness. 
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Figure 7. Corporate income tax (CIT) rates and revenue from those taxes as a % of total tax revenue 
 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 2013; Ernst & Young (2011). 
To avoid this problem, the nominal corporate income tax rate should be reduced in a revenue-neutral 
way by continuing to broaden the tax base. France’s high statutory tax rate is coupled with low revenues, 
measured either as a share of GDP or total tax revenues (Figure 7) because of the large number of 
loopholes and tax breaks. As the Conseil des Prélèvements Obligatoires (2009) points out, the result is an 
effective tax rate paid on realised profits of only 8% for companies included in the CAC40 and 22% for 
SMEs. More generally, the report finds that the effective tax rate diminishes as company size increases. 
The three major tax expenditures include: i) the tax consolidation regime, whereby the profits and losses of 
individual companies belonging to the same group may be consolidated (CPO, 2010), ii) the deductibility 
of interest payments on debt financing, and iii) the tax credit on investment in research and development. 
The way global corporations consolidate their profits depends on tax rates in other countries, so having a 
high nominal tax rate naturally encourages businesses to pay taxes elsewhere. If interest income is taxed at 
the household level, interest deductibility can be justified to avoid double taxation. The government’s 
decision to cap the deductibility of interest payments on borrowing goes in the direction of double taxation 
but at the same time will reduce the differential cost of debt and equity financing. 
While the tax burden falls with company size, there is a special corporate tax rate of 15% applying to 
profits not exceeding 38 000 euros for small businesses owned by physical persons and with annual 
turnover not exceeding 8 million euros. The experience of many OECD countries shows that a tax rate on 
small businesses much below that for self-employed individuals and wage earners will encourage income 
shifting from labour to capital income. This is not a danger in France because the average tax rate on net 
wages of 38 000 euros is exactly 15%. 
Taxation of the net capital stock 
Only a few OECD countries, including France, have net wealth taxes (Table 4). In principle, such 
taxes can be viewed as taxes on capital income. For instance, a 1% tax on the asset stock would correspond 
to a tax rate of 25% on the nominal return and 50% on the real return, under the assumption of a nominal 
return of 4% and an inflation rate of 2%. In France, wealth tax is levied on top of the direct taxation of 
capital income and yields receipts of 0.3% of GDP), and, as a result, substantially increases the tax rate on 
capital. Table 3 above shows that net wealth taxes almost double the maximum effective tax rate on capital 
income in all four OECD countries having such a tax. For those taxed at the marginal rate of 45% (41% in 
2011), the top marginal wealth tax rate in France generates effective tax rates of close to 200% for interest 
income, dividends and income from rented dwellings. This implies that the real value of the capital stock 
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of the wealthiest French citizens decreases significantly. Too high METRs could prompt tax avoidance and 
evasion and discourage saving and investment (Denk, 2012). 
Table 4. Net wealth taxes in OECD countries, 2011 
Country Highest marginal rate 
Assets 








assets 3 brackets, top bracket starts at EUR 3 million 
  




assets 6 brackets, top bracket starts at EUR 10 million 
Norway 1.10% Individuals' assets Above NOK 770.000 
Switzerland 1.50% Individuals' assets Rates vary across cantons 





Source: Ernst & Young (2011); Denk (2012). 
The harmful effect on saving of very high METRs stemming from a combination of capital income 
and wealth taxes can be better understood if they are thought of as taxes on deferred consumption. In 
France, if taxpayers subject to the highest marginal rate of the net wealth tax decide not to consume today 
but to save and consume their labour income 30 years later, the real value of their savings and thus their 
purchasing power will be more than one third lower at that point. By contrast, with the earlier assumptions, 
the real value of their savings would increase by more than 10% in the absence of the wealth tax and by 
80% if there were no capital income or wealth taxes. France’s capital income tax on deferred consumption 
and the combination of capital income tax and wealth tax are the steepest in the OECD for high-income 
earners (Table 5). In practice, there exists a wide range of METRs because of the many loopholes, 
especially those for savings products. 
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Table 5. The real value of savings (deferred consumption) after 30 years, 2011 
 First year = 1 
 Nominal return=4%, inflation=2%, taxes on fixed-income assets 
 No tax on capital income 
Tax on 
capital income  




Australia 1.79 1.06 Italy 1.79 1.42 
Austria 1.79 1.34 Japan 1.79 1.42 
Belgium 1.79 1.51 Korea 1.79 1.42 
Canada 1.79 1.34 Luxembourg 1.79 1.60 
Chile 1.79 1.19 Mexico 1.79 1.42 
Czech Republic  1.79 1.51 Netherlands 1.79 1.26 
Denmark 1.79 1.34 New Zealand 1.79 1.29 
Estonia 1.79 1.40 Norway 1.79 1.29 
Finland 1.79 1.29    with wealth tax 1.79 0.94 
France 2011 1.79 1.13 Poland 1.79 1.44 
   with wealth tax 1.79 0.66 Portugal   1.79 1.40 
France 2013 1.79 0.88 Slovak Republic 1.79 1.44 
   with wealth tax 1.79 0.57 Slovenia 1.79 1.42 
Germany 1.79 1.34 Spain 1.79 1.40 
Greece 1.79 1.60 Sweden 1.79 1.26 
Hungary  1.79 1.49 Switzerland 1.79 1.19 
Iceland 1.79 1.60    with wealth tax 1.79 0.77 
   with wealth tax 1.79 1.03 Turkey 1.79 1.51 
Ireland 1.79 1.26 United Kingdom 1.79 1.42 
Israel 1.79 1.34 United States 1.79 1.26 
Note: The calculations follow the methodology used by Denk (2012). The index on the real stock of savings shows the 
evolution after 30 years compared to the first year where the index = 1. Top marginal tax rates (where applicable) are 
used for the calculations.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
Residential housing enjoys considerable tax advantages 
Real estate enjoys preferential tax treatment compared to non-housing investment. The same holds 
true for home ownership relative to investment in rentals. The sources of non-neutrality are: i) imputed 
rent, the service that the owner receives from living in his property, is not taxed; ii) capital gains on 
primary residences are not taxed; iii) government provides subsidies for investment in private rental 
housing; and iv) only 70% of the net value of the primary residence enters the tax base of the wealth tax, 
while other financial and real assets are assessed at full value. On the other hand, the standard VAT is 
levied on the sale of new homes, which largely removes another potential source of non-neutrality related 
to the fact that the consumption of housing services is not subject to VAT. 
The first-best option to re-establish tax neutrality for housing would be to tax imputed rents at market 
value, which could be measured relatively easily, especially in cities, as the private rental market accounts 
for about 20% of the dwelling stock. Levying a tax on the market value of primary and secondary homes 
would do a similar job, even though this approach assumes that the price-to-rent ratio is homogeneously 
distributed geographically. In principle, the local property tax (taxe foncière) is based on properties’ rental 
values and thus implicitly taxes imputed rents. But the current taxe foncière is based on values obtained 
from cadastral registries, which were last updated only in the mid-1970s. The previous Survey 
recommended regular updates of these values to ensure a more realistic base for property taxes. Updating 
the system on a regular basis could turn this property tax into a direct tax on imputed rents. In such a case, 
actual rents from rental housing should not be taxed. A second complication is that the taxe foncière is 
determined at the local level. In order to make it work as a nation-wide tax on imputed rents, it should have 
a minimum uniform rate country-wide and be aligned with taxes on capital income from other sources. 
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Furthermore, the tax-free capital gains on primary residences should be aligned with capital gains due 
on other assets. Capital gains on secondary residences or rental real estate are fully exonerated from taxes 
if the property is owned for 30 years (compared to 15 years prior to 2012). The current system correctly 
allows the deduction of transaction and investment costs (including quality upgrades and additions but 
excluding maintenance, renovation and repair) from the tax base. Taxing capital gains on principal 
residences may discourage mobility, thereby creating lock-in effects. To circumvent this problem, the 
payment of capital gains taxes should be deferred if the receipts from the sale are used to buy another 
principal residence, in which case capital gains taxes should be payable on succession. 
Improving the taxation of the transfer of capital 
A final part of capital taxation concerns capital transfers. Taxes levied on transactions can be split into 
two broad groups: i) the purchase and sale of capital goods; and ii) the transfer of capital goods without 
any monetary compensation in the form of a bequest or gift. Taxes on the commercial transfer of financial 
assets are low, even though the new tax of 0.2% on transactions levied since August 2012 can potentially 
create large distortions in resource allocation. But transaction taxes and notary fees are very substantial for 
real estate (see the previous Survey). It is widely recognised that transaction costs are detrimental for 
economic growth because they discourage the optimal re-allocation of resources in the face of a changing 
economic environment. Lock-in effects caused by high real estate transactions costs could lead to reduced 
residential mobility and thus to sluggish labour-market adjustments. It would therefore be desirable to 
reduce transfer taxes on the sale of property by shifting to other less harmful types of taxes. 
As far as taxes levied on bequests and gifts are concerned, two major issues deserve discussion. First, 
a major justification for inheritance taxes is to reduce the inequality of opportunities and ex post income 
inequality. French inheritance taxes are strongly progressive and concern mostly very wealthy individuals. 
Inheritance taxes can also ensure that receiving a large bequest does not alter economic incentives by 
reducing the recipient’s labour supply. Therefore, unplanned bequests could, in principle, be taxed at a rate 
of 100% without having any influence on the receiver’s economic behaviour. But if bequests are planned 
in advance, a very high tax rate may discourage people from leaving bequests. 
Second, from a more practical viewpoint, inheritance taxes should be coordinated with gift taxes 
because taxes on bequests could be potentially avoided by planning bequests through inter vivos transfers. 
In France, exactly the same brackets and marginal rates apply for bequests and gifts to children. For more 
distant relatives taxes on bequests are not only at least as high as for children, but gifts are more heavily 
taxed than bequests (Table 6). Currently, children can receive from their parents a tax-free bequest or gift 
below a threshold of 100 000 euros (just lowered from 156 000 euros) every 15 years. After that, another 
period of 15 years starts with the same amount of tax-free bequest or gift. But the objective of reducing 
both income and wealth inequality would imply that gifts and bequests received over somebody’s lifetime 
should be considered, whatever the source (whether parents or more distant relatives or friends). It is 
important that unrealised capital gains, on both financial and real assets, should be taxed at the moment of 
succession. 
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Table 6. Top marginal rates on gifts and bequests in OECD countries, 2011 
 
Inheritance Gift Inheritance Gift Inheritance Gift Inheritance Gift 
 
Spouse Children Brothers &sisters Nephews & nieces 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 25 25 25 25 30 24 24 24 
Czech Republic  2.5 5 2.5 5 6 12 6 12 
Denmark 0 15 15 15 15 36.25 40 36.25 
Estonia 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Finland 16 16 16 16 32 32 32 32 
France 0 0 45 45 45 55 55 60 
Germany 30 30 30 43 43 43 43 43 
Greece 10 10 10 10 20 20 40 40 
Hungary  21 21 0 0 30 30 40 40 
Iceland 5 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 0 0 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Italy 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 
Japan 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Korea 50 n.a. 50 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg 16 4.8 15 1.8 28.8 6 48 8.4 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 20 20 20 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 10 10 15 15 15 15 
Poland 7 7 7 7 7 7 12 12 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 14 14 14 14 
Spain n.a. 34 n.a. 34 n.a. 34 n.a. 34 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey n.a. 15 n.a. 15 n.a. 30 n.a. 30 
United Kingdom n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 
United States n.a. 0 n.a. 35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Ernst & Young, International Estate and Inheritance Guide 2012, 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Estate-and-Inheritance-Tax-Guide---Country-list, retrieved in 
June 2012. 
Reduced VAT rates are an inefficient way to redistribute income  
Taxes on goods and services are an important part of the French tax system, accounting for about one 
fourth of total tax revenues. Given that the value of a good or service depends on the flow of benefits it 
provides, consumption taxes should be concerned with taxing these benefits (and not the transaction itself) 
either upfront when the good or service is first sold or annually, in line with the flow of benefits. The value 
added tax (VAT) is generally considered to be a good tax, and the use of excise duties can also be justified 
if they aim to internalise negative externalities triggered by the consumption of specific goods and 
services. The OECD, including in the previous Survey, has long advocated a VAT system based on a 
uniform rate and a broad tax base rather than one with multiple rates and a narrow base. 
The most common justification of reduced rates for essential goods and services is based on equity 
grounds: those products primarily purchased by the poor should be taxed less. Another argument is that the 
average propensity to consume is higher for the poor and thus they pay more of their income in a 
single-rated flat VAT scheme. Empirical observations show that in France, rich households benefit from 
those rates to a much larger extent than poor households (Bozio et al., 2012). In addition, some reduced 
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rates may be regressive, as for example in the case of restaurant meals and renting yachts. Micro 
simulations carried out by Ruiz and Trannoy (2008) for France show that reduced rates generate only a 
small amount of redistribution. Distributional objectives could be achieved more cost efficiently by 
considering the tax system as a whole rather than VAT in isolation. Therefore, reduced VAT rates should 
be eliminated. The very poor would be protected by the fact that social transfers (including the RSA) and 
minimum wages are indexed to inflation. If needed, further compensation could be provided by increasing 
means-tested lump-sum payments to reduce inequality at a lower cost (Mirrlees Review, 2011; 
OECD, 2011e). Such a system operates in Canada, where low- and modest-income households get a partial 
refund of estimated sales and value added taxes on their income taxes. 
As of January 2014, the intermediate VAT rate of 7% will increase to 10%, while the reduced rate of 
5.5% will drop to 5% and the standard rate will go up to 20% from 19.6%. The effective VAT rate is lower 
than the standard rate not only because of the numerous reduced rates but also because financial 
intermediation, unpaid domestic services and non-market educational, healthcare and social welfare 
services are not subject to VAT. It is difficult to levy VAT on domestic and non-market services. VAT on 
imputed and actual rents is imposed via VAT paid on new housing. 
A large dispersion of implicit carbon prices but good progress in internalising local pollution 
To the extent that damage done to the environment is not irreversible, the costs of negative 
externalities stemming from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and localised environmental pollution 
should be fully internalised in the final price of polluting products by setting taxes equal to the social costs 
of pollution. The two waves of the Grenelle programme launched under the Sarkozy presidency included a 
great number of price and non-price instruments aimed at mitigating GHG emissions and reducing local air 
and water pollution. Nevertheless, the current set-up is not cost efficient. Estimated carbon prices implied 
by existing taxes on various energy sources, including automotive fuel, heating oil, natural gas and coal, 
vary widely. 
Ideally, a single carbon price should be imposed across sectors (and countries) to reduce GHG 
emissions where it is the cheapest to do so (OECD, 2011e). This condition is generally not met, and in 
some cases the implicit price of CO2 is even quite negative (Figure 8). The tax system not only 
differentiates between different energy sources, but a large number of tax exemptions and reductions apply 
for a given energy source. A case in point is the excise tax exemption granted to fuel used for fishing 
vessels and maritime navigation and reductions for trucks, large agricultural vehicles, buses and taxis. 
However, the kilometric levy on heavy goods vehicles, which should take effect throughout France in 
July 2013, will cover more of the external costs associated with road freight traffic. In all, the dispersion of 
French carbon prices is relatively high but remains close to the average of the OECD countries for which 
this indicator can be calculated (Figure 8). Therefore, the government should seek to equalise implicit and 
explicit carbon prices across emission sources so as to minimise the cost of abatement. 
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Figure 8. Carbon price dispersion across OECD countries and within France, 2010-Q41 
EUR/tonne of CO2 
 
1. The implicit carbon tax level is obtained as follows: the starting point are excise taxes, from which two types of costs are 
deducted: i) the external costs of air pollution, noise and accidents; and ii) the external cost of the forms of pollution listed in i) 
plus that of congestion, standardised in EUR/tonne of CO2. See Figure 4.4 of the Economic Survey of France, 2011. 
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Economic Surveys of France 2011 and of Poland 2012. 
An additional weak point of current climate-change mitigation policies is the often substantial overlap 
between different instruments, which can increase the costs of achieving policy objectives. The two main 
examples are the upfront fees charged for passenger car purchases, in particular the bonus-penalty system 
introduced in 2008 and extended to hybrid and electric cars in mid-2012, and the compulsory feed-in tariffs 
for renewable energy sources. These tariffs represent a tax on final electricity consumers and overlap with 
both the implicit carbon prices contained in taxes on fossil energies and the price signal from the European 
emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS). The upfront financial penalty imposed by the bonus-penalty system 
may be justified if the price elasticity of fuel consumption is low and if myopic behaviour and asymmetric 
information would prevent consumers from fully perceiving the reduced lifecycle consumption of more 
carbon-efficient cars. But there is little economic justification for maintaining the bonus part, which 
financially rewards a negative global and local externality since even very low-emission cars cause a 
negative externality (OECD, 2011e). Even if the bonus-penalty system has led to a reduction in unit 
emissions and fuel consumption in new vehicles, a recent study (Givord and d’Haultfoeuille, 2012) shows 
that the bonus part increases global GHG emissions through an expansion of the car fleet and the so-called 
rebound effect (increased mileage). 
Feed-in tariffs targeted at renewables overlap with price signals provided by the EU-ETS and are 
therefore costly. But actively supporting renewables may be necessary if France wants to comply with 
renewables targets determined at the EU level or because of learning-by-doing and infant-industry 
arguments. Yet supporting renewable energy should be done in a cost-efficient and technology-neutral way 
by providing each technology the same amount of support per tonne of CO2 avoided. Abatement costs 
implied by feed-in tariffs fell significantly between 2009 and 2011, in particular for solar energy, and the 
dispersion of technology-specific abatement costs shrank sharply. Yet, these costs remain high for solar 
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energy and still vary substantially. This holds true even in international comparison, in which France is at 
the higher end of the scale (Figure 9). The government should further adjust and render abatement costs 
more homogeneous to achieve its renewables targets cost efficiently. 
Figure 9. Dispersion of carbon abatement costs implied by indirect support schemes (feed-in tariffs, green 
certificates)¹ 
EUR/tonne of CO2 
 
1. Abatement costs are calculated against a benchmark of coal-fired power plants. 
2. Min and max denote abatement costs based on the lowest and highest feed-in tariffs for specific energy groups. 
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Economic Survey of Poland 2012. 
With regard to the internalisation of local pollution, France has been making good progress in 
increasing the general tax on polluting activities (TGAP) for dumping and burning waste. The tax on 
landfill was raised to 20 euros per tonne in 2010, broadly in line with estimated external costs, and is 
expected to be boosted to 40 euros by 2015. The TGAP aligns taxes on incineration with social costs. In 
contrast, the external costs of pesticide and fertiliser use is currently only partially internalised or not at all, 
as emphasised in the previous Survey (OECD, 2011e). So the government should think about the 
introduction of a tax on fertilisers and raising the tax on pesticides to match estimated external costs. With 
regard to air pollution, the 2013 budget raised TGAP rates on sulphur oxide and other compounds, lowered 
the application threshold and extended the TGAP to five new pollutants that can be found in the air 
(benzene, arsenic, selenium, mercury and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons). The government has 
announced that it intends to raise additional environmental tax revenues of EUR 3 billion by 2016, but the 
details have not yet been made public. 
The transfer system should be simplified 
The French cash transfer system is the cornerstone of the system of income redistribution, as it 
channels roughly 70% of redistributed income. Social spending, including public expenditure on family, 
housing, unemployment, survivor and disability benefits and active labour market policies (ALMPs), 
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accounts for 10% of GDP, the seventh highest in the OECD (Figure 10, Panel A). But if old-age pensions 
and health-care spending are also taken into account, France becomes the top OECD spender, with the 
share of this wider but less comparable definition of social spending reaching 30% of GDP. With the 
exception of incapacity and miscellaneous social spending, in 2009 every subcategory of social spending 
represented a higher share of GDP in France than in the OECD average (Figure 10, Panel C). Looking at 
the respective shares of various social spending in total social spending reveals that France spends 
considerably more on old-age pensions and somewhat more on survivors’ pensions, labour-market-related 
policies and housing than the average OECD country (Figure 10, Panel D). 
Figure 10. Social spending in France and the OECD, 2009 
 
1. Active labour market policy. 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure (SOCX) database. 
The system is complex, with more than 60 spending programmes (in addition to the 90-odd old-age 
and survivors’ pension schemes). Complexity increases administrative costs, and the resulting lack of 
transparency poses a barrier for potential beneficiaries and reduces benefit take-up. There is also a general 
problem regarding the system’s overall consistency because some transfers overlap with others and they 
are not always designed jointly, sometimes because of coordination problems among different levels of 
government. Decisions are not always based on detailed cost evaluations. For instance, the cutback in 
places in the public pre-school education system for 2-3 year-old children (école maternelle) for 
cost-saving reasons was largely offset by more places in alternative forms of public pre-school education 
(such as halte-garderie and crèche), which are actually more costly to public finances. Objectives of 
spending programmes can be contradictory. For instance, family policies seek to improve conditions for 
pre-school childcare to allow parents (mostly women) to return quickly to the labour market, whereas the 
parental leave allowance (complement de libre choix d’activité, CLCA, paid subject to certain work-related 
conditions) to those deciding to stay at home with young children give strong incentives, especially for 
(low-skilled) low-income individuals to stay at home for many years, which considerably reduces their 
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chances to ever return to work. Moreover, the revenue base and thresholds of means-tested transfers are 
not always harmonised, and the period for which income is considered can differ. For instance, 
past-quarter income is the basis of the incentive part of the RSA, income lagged one year serves as a basis 
for PPE (prime pour l’emploi), and income lagged two years is used to determine eligibility for housing 
subsidies. 
Against this backdrop, a strong case can be made for a simplified cash transfer to households. One 
avenue to explore (currently in an experimental stage in the United Kingdom) would be to combine all 
means-tested and non-means-tested benefits into a single benefit in a budget-neutral way, improving the 
system’s transparency and eliminating its inconsistencies. This single benefit should also include housing 
benefits, provided the landlord-tenant relationship is rebalanced as recommended in the previous Survey. 
Conditionality of unemployment benefits should be strengthened 
 Public spending on unemployment benefits and active labour market measures (ALMPs) as a share of 
GDP are relatively high in France, but it ranks lower if spending on ALMPs is measured per unemployed 
relative to per capita GDP (Figure 11). Reasonably high net replacement rates offered by unemployment 
benefits, such as France’s 70%, coupled with a fairly generous maximum duration are viewed as justified 
to ensure that job seekers can find a position that fits their skills. Active measures, especially retraining 
programmes, may be necessary to help unemployed individuals update their human capital or acquire new 
skills, which would improve their job-market prospects. But benefits should be combined with incentives 
to shorten unemployment spells and avoid long-term unemployment, which is costly to the individuals 
concerned, public finances and society. 
Figure 11. Active labour market policies and unemployment benefits1 
 
1. Active labour market policies include public employment services and administration, training, employment incentives, 
integration of the disabled, direct job creation, and start-up incentives. 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure (SOCX), Employment Policies/ALMP and Labour Force Statistics databases. 
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When the economy recovers, the incentives embedded in the French system to return to work could be 
strengthened, without magnifying income inequalities, via degressivity and/or conditioning benefits on 
participation in active measures and the obligation of accepting “reasonable” job offers. First, the 
maximum duration of benefits is two years (three years for those aged 50 and above), and the replacement 
rate stays flat over this period. Long-term unemployment benefits (allocation de solidarité spécifique, 
ASS, and allocation équivalent retraite, AER) prolong that period considerably. The ASS is a long-term 
unemployment benefit that is very near to the level of the basic RSA, but it enables an accumulation of 
pension entitlements (see below). The AER, which is significantly higher than the ASS and basic RSA, is 
intended for those unemployed who have contributed long enough for a full pension but have not reached 
the minimum retirement age. Abolished in 2011, the AER is likely to be restored in 2013, under strict 
eligibility conditions, for persons born in 1952 or 1953. Care should be taken not to prolong this scheme, 
which encourages early departures from the labour market and is a drain on public finances, and to provide 
a bonus (surcote) instead. 
Empirical evidence for several countries suggests that jobseekers tend to intensify search efforts as 
they come close to the end of benefit eligibility. But as jobs are less plentiful during downturns, duration 
and the amount of benefits should depend on the local unemployment rate. Second, the METR implied by 
the withdrawal of the unemployment benefits varies from 75% to 90% for a wide range of income and 
family situations (Table 2). Therefore, it is important to effectively condition benefits on active job search 
and participation in retraining programmes. According to a 2008 law, non-acceptance of a second 
“appropriate” job offer is sanctioned, in principle, by the withdrawal of the benefits for two months. The 
lack of available data makes it impossible to dispel suspicions that benefits are in fact rarely withdrawn 
when job offers are refused. Introducing degressivity, i.e. a decline in the unemployment benefit during the 
spell, would strengthen incentives to find a new job, in particular because the reservation wage declines 
with the chances of finding work again and when the end of the benefit period approaches, just as does 
conditioning unemployment benefits on active job search. But gradual degressivity can be complex to 
administer if there is overlap between unemployment benefits and other social transfers. However, a 
steeper drop, with two steps, for example, over the duration of eligibility for payments, could avoid this 
problem. In fact, this form of degressivity has been implemented in many OECD countries (Table 7). 
Whereas according to Dormont et al. (2001) the degressivity with which France experimented in the 1990s 
did not appear to have any positive impact on getting people back to work, Prieto (2000) suggests that a 
more abrupt drop in benefits increases returns to work more than a gradual decrease. 
Table 7. Degressivity of unemployment benefits in Europe, 2010 
For a 40-year old (where benefits are conditional on work history, the table assumes a long and uninterrupted 
employment record) 
 
Payment rate (% of earnings base) 
 
Initial At end of legal entitlement period 
Belgium 60  53.8 (after 1 year) 
Czech Republic 65 50-45 (after 2 and 4 months) 
Estonia 50 40 (after 101 days) 
Italy 60 50 after 6 months 
Netherlands 75  70 (after 2 months) 
Poland Fixed amount 30% of average wage Fixed amount 23% of AW (after 3 months) 
Slovenia 70 60 (after 3 months) 
Spain 70 60 (after 6 months) 
Sweden 80 70 (after 9 months). 65 (after 14 months) 
Latvia 65 32.5 after 7 months 
Lithuania 40 + fixed amount of LTL 350 per month 20 after 3 months 
Source: www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives  
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Furthermore, the public employment service (PES), Pôle emploi, is well placed to administer the 
unemployed and deal with benefit payments, but it struggles to carefully monitor jobseekers and provide 
them with tailored training and job solutions. For instance, a counsellor monitors an average of 
160 jobseekers (Pôle emploi, 2012), which is two to three times higher than in the United Kingdom. 
Relative to the number of jobseekers, the personnel of the French PES is half of that in Germany and the 
United Kingdom (Inspection Générale des Finances, 2011). Since 2009 Pôle emploi has faced competition 
from private job-placement agencies. A recent report commissioned by the Senate argues that a more 
intense monitoring would necessitate more resources (Alduy, 2011). The recent report Dares-Pôle 
emploi (2013) shows that people who are closely assisted by a private organisation get more intensive and 
personalised assistance, but that back-to-work and back-to-long-term-work rates are higher for the 
unemployed who are assisted by Pôle emploi than for those assisted by private agencies. However, no 
concise information is available on the costs of placing a jobseeker permanently in a new job. Overall, 
better data should be collected with regard to cost effectiveness. Australia could be a useful benchmark of 
how performance-related contracts with private providers, which would increase competition and sort out 
low-quality firms, can help place benefit recipients into permanent jobs in a cost-efficient way 
(Behaghel et al., 2012; OECD, 2012b). The experiments in outsourcing job-placement services carried out 
in the Netherlands also show the importance of the type of contracts concluded and the incentives given to 
outside operators. 
Pôle Emploi’s new three-year strategic plan (Objectif 2015), decided in July 2012, includes progress 
in terms of performance measurement and better targeting at those in difficult situations. It calls for staff 
redeployments and additional resources so that the advisers in charge of helping the job-seekers least 
equipped for the labour market carry a case load of no more than 70 persons. Yet, there are also three 
burning coordination and efficiency-related issues that should be addressed. First, the unemployment 
benefit system, UNEDIC, is run by the social partners for historical reasons: UNEDIC was founded by the 
social partners in 1958. The main parameters of the system are decided by the trade unions and employer 
organisations. The government’s only power is to refuse to sign the convention: this has happened only 
once over the last 40 years. UNEDIC is independent from the State, and the social security administration 
and can issue its own bonds to finance it deficits. But the State explicitly guaranteed UNEDIC’s bond 
issuance in 2011 and 2012 (Standard & Poor’s, 2012) and, more generally, the debt of UNEDIC enjoys a 
virtually explicit State guarantee. Second, training programmes offered to the unemployed are provided by 
local governments (regions), Pôle emploi and the State. A failure of co-ordination among these actors may 
easily lead to badly targeted programmes (CNFPT, 2010). Pôle Emploi’s 2015 strategic plan includes a 
number of measures to enhance the effectiveness of training services. Finally, the integration of ANPE and 
ASSEDIC into Pôle emploi has not yet reaped its full benefits, because of difficulties in fully automating 
back-office paperwork (Alduy, 2011). Overall, the government should seek to improve the cost 
effectiveness of the system and better enforce and strengthen activation policies. 
Social transfers should be focused on getting beneficiaries into jobs 
The active solidarity income (RSA) is the cornerstone of France’s broad-based social assistance. Its 
introduction in 2009 helped streamline the complex web of social benefits, an encouraging step forward. 
The basic scheme (RSA socle) provides basic financial support for jobless individuals according to their 
household income and composition. Household income is assessed on a very broad basis, including all 
other regular benefits (housing, family, etc). One of the aims of the 2009 reform was to combine social 
assistance with a back-to-work support strategy by strengthening conditionality: benefit recipients were 
meant to be obliged to actively look for a job and enrol in retraining and other ALMPs (OECD-ILO, 2011). 
Non-compliance with regularly meeting with social and job counsellors or participating in active 
programmes results in the suspension of benefit payments. But implementation of the incentive element 
remains limited: some RSA recipients are not advised at all, and monitoring is insufficient. Instead of a 
single counsellor in Pôle emploi, basic RSA recipients are advised by other bodies as well, including the 
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social security administration and local governments (OECD-ILO, 2011; Bourguignon, 2011). At the 
beginning of 2012, sanctions for non-compliance with job-search obligations by basic RSA recipients were 
toughened. This measure is welcome, but whether it is applied systematically remains to be checked. 
The financial work incentive (RSA activité) is a bonus of about 60% for every euro earned below a 
ceiling and decreasing linearly above that. It eliminates the previous poverty trap, which was the result of 
having any extra income lead to a proportionate reduction in social benefits. Yet, the overall result of the 
reform on employment is uncertain, and enrolment rates remain low for activity RSA. Nevertheless, 
Bourguignon (2011) shows that the RSA alleviates poverty substantially. 
The specific solidarity allowance (allocation de solidarité spécifique, ASS), a long-term 
unemployment benefit conferring entitlement to a retirement pension, is targeted in general at unemployed 
people after the expiry of their unemployment benefits and at specific occupational groups (artists, seamen 
and dockworkers) in case of unemployment in the absence of unemployment insurance eligibility. ASS is 
conditional on five years of work during the 10 years preceding the end of the employment contract and is 
household means-tested. It requires job search and, like the RSA, offers a safety net while at the same time 
allowing the accumulation of benefits and income so as to encourage a return to work. But a major 
drawback of ASS is that it can reduce the labour supply of certain older workers, especially 
low-skill/low-income workers. If somebody becomes unemployed at the age of 52 and has worked long 
enough, after having received unemployment benefits for three years, (s)he may receive social benefits 
until retirement. The ASS is replaced by plain unemployment benefits for those aged 61 and over: those of 
this age coming to the end of their three years of unemployment benefits are entitled to continued 
unemployment benefits until they reach the minimum retirement age. Indeed, almost half of those 
receiving ASS in 2010 were aged 50 or over (DARES, 2012). While access to ASS is stricter than for 
RSA, it is also more generous, in particular because it confers pension entitlements. 
Disability benefits are a potential channel of benefit substitution 
Strengthening work and activation requirements for social assistance and shutting down implicit 
channels of early retirement through unemployment benefits could give rise to benefit substitution towards 
incapacity benefits, for instance. Optimal policy design should therefore firmly maintain access conditions 
to disability pensions (Røed and Westlie, 2012). Disability pensions are naturally higher than income 
support from social assistance. Also, even though disability benefits are less generous than unemployment 
benefits, the lack of work and activation requirements could make them appealing. Public spending on 
incapacity benefits (disability pensions and sickness allowances) are relatively low in France (2% of GDP), 
and the share of disability benefit recipients in the working-age population is also comparatively low, yet 
rising since the mid-1990s (Figure 12). Incapacity-related public spending consists primarily of passive 
measures (cash benefits). Flanking measures include anti-discrimination laws and a penalty for private and 
public companies in case of non-compliance with employment quotas for disabled people. That employers 
hire mostly only moderately disabled people is not surprising, given the absence of differentiation for the 
quota among different levels of disability (OECD, 2010; IZA, 2010). Inflows to disability pensions could 
be reduced in two ways. First, the length of sick leaves should be monitored carefully because an extended 
duration increases the probability of entering disability, and, in 2004 at least, the average duration of sick 
leave in France was among the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2005). Second, as in many other OECD 
countries, disability rates are higher for low-skill and older workers. Furthermore, the employment rate of 
disabled people is well below that of people without any disabilities, and disabled people, if they work at 
all, tend to hold part-time jobs. Hence, in contrast with current practise, ALMPs (including job counselling, 
training and education) should have a place in the disability policy mix, which would complement income 
security with work incentives. 
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Figure 12. Incapacity-related public spending and disability benefit receipt rates in OECD countries 
 
1. Or latest year available; 2007 for France. 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure (SOCX) database and OECD (2013), Mental Health and Work: Belgium. 
Family benefits are tilted towards those having at least three children 
Family policies embodied in family benefits seek to encourage people to have more children and aim 
to maintain living standards of families with children in accordance with horizontal equity. In this spirit, 
families with children should pay lower taxes because their living standards are lower compared to those of 
childless households with the same earnings. It is often argued that such a policy is regressive from a 
vertical equity point of view because it subsidises children more in wealthy families. However, horizontal 
equity can be achieved without increasing overall income inequality by taxing households without children 
at higher marginal rates than those with children. The empirical literature suggests that these monetary 
incentives, which combined with other family policies diminish the cost of raising children, have a tangible 
effect on fertility rates (D’Addio and Mira D’Ercole, 2005; Luci and Thévenon, 2012). Both the fertility 
rate and spending on family policies as a share of GDP are in fact high in France (Figure 13). Spending on 
family policies involves direct cash payments, numerous tax breaks and in-kind benefits. The two main 
fiscal measures used to achieve horizontal equity and thus reduce extra costs of having children are basing 
family taxation on the number of children and paying non-means-tested family allowances. In 2010 tax 
reductions for children and spouses cost more than 1% of GDP and family allowances 0.6% of GDP. 
Family support is tilted towards those having at least three children. For personal income tax, the first 
two children are allocated 0.5 part, while others are worth a full part in the calculation. The monthly 
family allowance is zero for one child, about 130 euros for two children, and more than 160 euros for each 
additional child. Means-tested benefit (complément familial) is available for families with three or more 
children older than three. It is noteworthy that other entitlements are also sensitive to numbers of children. 
For instance, both parents are entitled to a (non-taxable) 10% increase in pension benefits if they have 
raised three or more children. Families who have to move because of the arrival of a third child are also 
entitled to a moving allowance. 
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Figure 13. Fertility rates and family benefits 
 
1. Public support included here concerns only that which is exclusively for families (e.g. child payments and allowances, parental 
leave benefits and childcare support). Spending recorded in other social policy areas such as health and housing support also 
assists families, but not exclusively, and is not included here. 
Source: OECD Family database. 
The design of the parental leave allowance may push low-skill mothers into an inactivity trap 
Another important aspect of family policies is the granting of a parental leave allowance (CLCA) 
before and after birth and the access to pre-school childcare, which jointly determine whether and when 
women return to work. Maternity leave is 16 weeks (26 weeks from the third child). After maternity leave, 
parents have three options: i) staying at home with the newborn and receiving an allowance; ii) employing 
a qualified nanny or putting the child in a private nursery and receiving direct cash payments and a tax 
credit on 50% of the nanny’s employer SSCs; or iii) placing the child in a public nursery (crèche or 
halte-garderie), where children whose parents both work have preferential treatment. The two latter 
measures, backed by a lump-sum income-dependent benefit for young children (on top of the family 
allowance), clearly favour female labour market participation. Whereas enrolment rates of around 40% in 
formal pre-school childcare institutions for 0 to 2 year-old children are relatively high, there is scope to 
increase them further. Quality, reflected in the children-to-teaching-staff ratio for 0 to 3 year-olds, seems to 
be a problem (Figure 14). There is also anecdotal evidence that public nurseries for 0 to 3 year-olds are not 
evenly distributed geographically and not sufficiently targeted at low-income, single-parent households, 
who cannot benefit from tax advantages. 
The design of the parental leave allowance (CLCA) may create an inactivity trap for low-skill 
(low-income) mothers by, in certain cases, offering them the benefit for six consecutive years: this flat 
amount can be received for six months for the first child and three years after the birth of the second and 
third children, provided they are born within, respectively, four and five years after the mother’s last job. 
This can give the following birth pattern: first child in year t, second in t+1 and third in t+3. After six years 
spent at home, low-skill women may find it very difficult to return to the labour market (even though their 
job is kept in the company in which they worked before the birth of their first child). Indeed, the 
employment rate of low-skill women of childbearing age is low (Figure 4). The CLCA leads to an 
acceptable replacement rate for low-income individuals/families, but high-income earners’ low 
replacement rate encourages an early return to one’s former job. Admittedly, the current system has a mild 
incentive element for women to return to work more quickly after the second or third child: instead of 
staying at home three years with the third child, the mother can decide to stay only one additional year at 
home (reducing the six years to four), and receive a 30% higher allowance in return. Overall, the duration 
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of the CLCA should be shortened. A precondition of a shorter parental leave is an increase in places in 
nurseries available for children aged less than three. 
Figure 14. Enrolment rates in formal pre-school childcare institutions and the ratio of children to teaching staff 
in formal daycare services 
 
1. Enrolment rates are given in full-time equivalents. 
2. Average for 0-3 year-olds. 
Source: OECD Family database. 
The system as it stands now has a potentially strong redistributive element. Means-tested support for 
private pre-school child care and income-based fees in nurseries certainly favour the less affluent. In 
addition, there is some overlap between the CLCA, the means-tested benefits relating to the start of the 
school year (allocation de rentrée scolaire) and a young-child allowance for dual-career families 
(allocation de base de la prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant, PAJE). Furthermore, annual income caps 
vary to a large extent across different measures: about EUR 49 000 for a single-earner couple with three 
children for the birth allowance and PAJE, EUR 35 000 for the complementary benefit related to the third 
child, EUR 34 000 for the school starting allowance and EUR 27 000 for the direct subsidies of private 
pre-school childcare. 
Housing subsidies should be better integrated with the rest of the transfer system 
Amongst OECD countries, France spends a relatively large amount of its GDP on direct housing 
subsidies (Figure 15).The relevant transfers are the personalised housing support (aide personnalisée au 
logement, APL), the social housing benefit (allocation de logement social, ALS) and the family housing 
benefit (allocation de logement familial, ALF), together worth around EUR 16 billion a year and covering 
roughly 6 million households. They can lower either the rent or the monthly reimbursement of first-home 
buyers. APL supports low-income families and is paid directly to the landlord or to the bank (in the case of 
mortgage repayments). The landlord has to sign an agreement with the State. He or she gets special tax 
treatment but has to respect a rent ceiling. ALF can be used by families with children or young couples 
who do not qualify for APL. ALS is designed for low-income individuals who cannot benefit from APL 
and ALF. The benefits are means-tested: eligibility depends on household income and the working 
situation of its members but also the composition of the household and the location of the dwelling. Not 
only is the system very complicated, which makes it difficult for potential recipients to gain an overview 
and increases the administrative burden (all three benefits are administered by the Caisses d'allocations 
familiales, CAF), but it also has some serious drawbacks. First, means-testing is based on income reported 
two years before the application. This is too long a delay: potential beneficiaries might have higher income 
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or become unemployed in the meantime. Second, the amount of support is a function of the rent below a 
certain fixed amount, which is akin to making the subsidy vary with the size of the flat. It would be better 
to have a fixed amount and leave the decision to the tenants whether they want to have a smaller flat and 
keep some of the money or take a bigger dwelling and have a higher out-of-pocket payment. Finally, 
according to HCF (2012), the income thresholds for means-testing have not been fully adjusted for higher 
market prices, which has reduced the redistributive impact of the system. 
Figure 15. Public spending on housing benefits in OECD countries, 2009 
 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure (SOCX) database. 
The complexity of the financing side does not enhance transparency either. ALS and APL are 
financed by FNAL (Fonds national d'aides au logement), whereas the financing of ALF is provided by 
FNPF (Fonds national des prestations familiales). These funds are fed by central government transfers and 
employer SSCs. Indeed, businesses with more than 20 employees are required to pay 0.95% of their wage 
bill as a contribution (which sums to EUR 4 billion, given various exemptions). Roughly half of that goes 
to FNAL; the rest finances subsidies for first-time homebuyers and improvements to the private housing 
stock, expanding the rental housing supply, subsidies for relocating workers and funding for national 
policies, in the realm of urban renewal in particular. 
Public support to housing goes well beyond direct subsidies. Various tax breaks violate tax neutrality 
and bias investment decisions and should therefore be phased out. Social housing, which in principle can 
be an important element of income redistribution, enjoys generous tax breaks, direct government subsidies 
and soft loans. While targeting has improved over time, the last Survey pointed to a number of weaknesses: 
i) the funding through special subsidised savings vehicles potentially distorts saving and investment 
decisions at the macroeconomic level; ii) social housing operators are too fragmented to exploit economies 
of scale and do a poor job of targeting needy neighbourhoods; iii) rents depend on past funding costs and, 
to a variable extent depending on the area, are unrelated to market rents; iv) tenant turnover is very low; 
and v) a part of social housing benefits well-to-do households, which reduces redistributive effects. 
Improvement on these points would substantially raise the system’s cost effectiveness. 
Old-age pension complexity should be reduced to facilitate necessary systemic reforms 
The French old-age pension system has a highly complicated structure with around 40 compulsory 
schemes with different eligibility criteria and pension benefits. Simplifying this complex structure is 
essential to facilitate transparency for employees who switch sectors and pension regimes over their 
careers, and most importantly, to increase fairness by reducing pension privileges of those enrolled in 
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special pension schemes. Such heightened transparency could also facilitate achievement of financial 
equilibrium in the system. A system based on points or notional accounts is probably the solution that 
would offer the most operational flexibility. 
Special pension regimes (including for the civil service) cover almost 4 million pensioners, essentially 
former civil servants, employees of state-owned companies and those in some specific sectors (miners, 
notaries and seamen), and pay annual benefits amounting to 3.5% of GDP. These regimes tend to offer 
more generous retirement conditions than the general scheme. Specific groups of civil servants in “active” 
service, including military personnel, policemen, firemen and prison guards, and in dirty jobs such as 
sewermen, can retire before the legal retirement rate and receive a pension after a shorter minimum 
contribution period (Table 8). Employees of the electricity and gas sectors, railway workers and employees 
of the Paris public transport company enjoy similarly favourable retirement conditions. The rules to 
calculate pension benefits for civil servants are so different from those in the private sector that it is 
difficult to have an overall idea about which scheme provides higher pensions. Overall, no reliable 
information is available about the costs of the special regimes. But one pre-condition of EDF/GDF being 
listed on the stock exchange in 2005 was the incorporation of its pension regime in the general scheme. 
Because the eligibility criteria were left unchanged, the State had to pay a compensation of about 0.5% of 
GDP to the national pension insurance fund (CNAV), an amount corresponding to the net present value of 
future pension payments due to its special conditions. 
Table 8. Major special pension regimes in 2009 
 Number 
 of retirees 
(thousand) 
Pension benefits paid 
(EUR billion 
per annum) 
Minimum retirement age 
Civil servants    
Central government 1590 
41.6 
5 years less than in the general system for 
policemen, prison guards 
Army 499 After 15 or 25 years of contribution 
Local governments  
(CNRACL) 927 12.0 
5 years less than in the general system for firemen, 
policemen and 10 years less for specific categories 
(e.g. sewermen) 
Gas and electricity industry 
(CNIEG) 152 3.8  
Railways (CRPSNCF) 284 5.1 10 years less for “rolling” employees and 5 years less for the rest 
Paris transport company 
(CRPRATP) 41 0.9  
Industrial workers of public 
companies (FSPOIE) 62 1.5 5 years less for specific groups (service actif) 
Bailiffs and notaries 
(CRPCEN) 65 0.7  
Seamen (ENIM) 73 1.1 10 years less in the case of 25 years of contribution 
Miners (CANSSM) 183 1.7 50 years for pit workers 
Churches (CAVIMAC) 57 0.2  
Banque de France 12 0.4  
Opera de Paris 2 0.02  
Comédie française 2 0.005  
Tobacco industry (SEITA) 2 0.2  
Port autonome de 
Strasbourg 2   
Total 3 953 69.2  
Source: Bureau des régimes spéciaux, Direction de la sécurité sociale. 
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While France’s public spending on old-age pensions is among the highest in the OECD relative to 
GDP, it is projected to increase only at a slow pace, by a further 0.5 percentage point of GDP by 2060 
(European Commission, 2012). The 2010 pension reform aimed to ease pension spending obligations by 
progressively extending the minimum legal retirement age from 60 to 62 years and the retirement age to 
receive a full pension from 65 to 67 years by 2018 (which was subsequently brought forward to 2017 as 
part of fiscal consolidation). Under the 2003 Fillon reform, the government may change, by decree, the 
minimum contribution period, using expert opinions regarding changes in life expectancy at age 60. 
Accordingly, the minimum contribution period needed for a full pension, which was 40 years at the time of 
the reform, was increased to 41.5 years for people born in 1955 or later. This is an important step towards 
long-term sustainability. However, the link between gains in life expectancy and the contribution period 
conferring entitlement to full pension benefits should be rendered fully automatic, such as in Latvia, 
Poland, Sweden and Norway (European Commission, 2012), thereby removing the possibility of any 
government interference. Scheme participants who have not contributed long enough to have a full pension 
are penalised by 1.25% per missing quarter on the pension payment. However, whatever the number of 
years worked, everybody receives a full pension when retiring at 67, without any penalty but still 
proportional to the contribution period. The government’s decision in June 2012 to reduce the minimum 
retirement age to 60 years for those who have reached the contribution period giving the right to a full 
pension increases fairness as they were unduly penalised by the rise in the minimum retirement age to 
62 years. At the same time, as this change could impose an annual financial burden of EUR 1.1 billion in 
the short run and almost EUR 3 billion in 2017 on the pension system and hence public finances, the 
government decided to increase pension contributions. Overall, maintaining 62 as the minimum legal 
retirement age and providing long-career workers a bonus for extra years worked would have been 
preferable. According to a recent report by the Pension Advisory Board (Conseil d’Orientation des 
Retraites, 2013), under the best of circumstances, the pension system’s balance can be restored only in the 
long term (by the early 2040s in a best-case scenario). However, under a number of long-term 
macroeconomic scenarios, the pension system’s deficit would persist until 2060. Between 2012 and 2040, 
the accumulated debt of the pension system would amount to between 15 and 50% of GDP. Consequently, 
additional adjustments to the pension system’s parameters will be needed quickly to reach financial 
balance. 
Achieving actuarial fairness and neutrality would help maintain the pension system’s long-term 
sustainability. An actuarially fair system would ensure, in a broader sense, that expected pension benefits 
would be directly linked to pension contributions paid over the working lifetime. According to a narrow 
definition of actuarial fairness at the individual level, the net present value of lifetime contributions and the 
net present value of lifetime benefits should be equal (Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006). But there is a 
trade-off between actuarial fairness and a potential desire to reduce income inequality in the pension 
system through redistribution, which would reduce fairness at the individual level. In France, pension 
benefits in the general system are determined on the basis of the best 25 years’ income over one’s career. 
The full career should be taken into account to approach actuarial fairness. Actuarial neutrality means that 
working longer is not penalised and that marginal incentives to continue working are the same at all ages 
(which in theory would imply that bonuses and penalties should vary according to age). The bonus and 
penalty applied in the French system seem to broadly achieve this. 
The 2010 reform also scheduled discussions to take place in 2013 about achieving long-term balance 
in the pension system. A universal pension system based on points or with individual notional accounts 
would not only make it easier to enforce actuarial neutrality and fairness, it would also provide the 
flexibility to achieve financial balance as population ageing proceeds. In addition, it would make the 
system more transparent for the insured. Points can be converted into pension payments using an aggregate 
conversion coefficient, which accounts for life expectancy at the time of retirement, demographic 
projections and projected receipts and outlays of the pension system. The conversion coefficient can be set 
in a way to balance outlays with receipts. Such a system is well equipped to deal with forthcoming 
population ageing insofar as the conversion factor can be revised during pensioners’ lifetimes. But this 
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flexibility would come at the expense of reducing intergenerational equity. A points-based system could 
also have redistributive elements, which would come at a cost of distorting actuarial fairness at the 
individual level. 
Old-age poverty rates in France are below the OECD average. Pension systems in some countries, 
including the Czech Republic, New Zealand and the Netherlands, generate extremely low old-age poverty 
rates, well below those observed in the general population, and almost no pension inequality between men 
and women. In France, the poverty rate for pensioners is comparable to that of workers and lower than for 
the whole population; however, older women tend to fall much more often below the poverty line than 
their male counterparts (Figure 16). Indeed, the French system reduces pension inequality to a large 
degree: gross and net pension replacement rates are considerably lower for high-income earners than for 
low-income individuals (OECD, 2011c). Retirement income is redistributed via several channels. Some 
measures aim to top up low pension benefits. They include a minimum pension paid by the general regime 
(minimum contributif) and a means-tested minimum income benefit (minimum vieillesse), which is paid 
mostly to people with low-incomes (OECD, 2011c). Other measures seek to compensate for shorter careers 
to achieve the minimum contribution period needed for a full pension: periods of unemployment during 
which unemployment benefits are received and time spent in sickness and invalidity are taken into account 
for benefit determination. On the other hand, Aubert and Bachelet (2012) show empirically that taking the 
best 25 years as a basis for the calculation of pension benefits amplifies pension income inequality because 
low-income individuals tend to have shorter careers than those with high earnings. 
Figure 16. Old-age poverty rates in OECD countries, mid 2000s 
Percentage with incomes less than 50% of median household disposable income 
 
Source: OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance. 
Survivors’ pensions lower female participation and discriminate against private-sector pensioners 
and unmarried people 
Survivors’ pension benefits account for almost 2% of France’s GDP, which is higher than the OECD 
average (Figure 10, Panel C above). This system should internalise the costs of death within the family 
(James, 2009). Moreover, they imply redistribution from women who work to those who stay at home and 
from singles and two-earner families to single-earner families, penalising second-earners’ labour market 
participation. Survivors’ pensions are indeed generous in France because they do not account for the cost 
of such additional (life) insurance. Employees should be able to opt for survivors’ pensions, as in Sweden, 
in which case they would either pay higher contribution rates or receive lower pension benefits 
(Whitehouse, 2013). 
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There is also some disparity between eligibility criteria for survivors’ pensions for private- and 
public-sector employees. The spouse of a private-sector pensioner can claim survivors’ benefits if he or she 
is older than 55. The survivor benefit cannot exceed 60% of the pension of the deceased, is means tested 
and has an upper limit. By contrast, a spouse of a public-sector retiree can receive survivor benefits without 
any restrictions regarding the survivor’s age and income (but the survivor benefit rate may not exceed 
50%). The survivor benefit is increased by half of the 10% bonus received after three or more children. 
Overall, the asymmetric treatment of private- and public-sector pensioners should be phased out. 
In-kind benefits: health-care and education services 
In-kind benefits provided through public (health and education) services reduce income inequality in 
France. Their redistributive impact depends on the volume of those services and the targeting of the 
benefits. Health-care services make a substantial contribution to income redistribution because of their 
sheer mass: public health-care expenditures account for 9% of French GDP and cover 80% of total 
health-care spending. The same amount of public services, allocated as a first approximation in equal 
portions to all households increases household disposable incomes more the lower the household is in the 
income distribution. INSEE estimates suggest that a few years ago public in-kind benefits from health-care 
services accounted for over 35% of the reduction in income inequality (Marical, 2007; Amar et al., 2008). 
Redistribution occurs along the following dimensions: gender, age and income. Women of 
childbearing age tend to consume more health services than men of the same age. Children and elderly 
people make more use of public health-care services than other demographic groups, leading to horizontal 
redistribution between families of different size and between different generations. Intergenerational 
redistribution is amplified by the fact that old people tend to be situated in the lower part of the income 
distribution. When age and gender are controlled for, low-income individuals consume more hospital 
services and primary care, the reimbursement rates for which are high, in contrast to dental and specialist 
care, of which wealthier people avail themselves more often. The fact that public health insurance covers 
the bulk of hospital and primary care, combined with socialised funding, results in redistribution to those 
least well-off through the health-care system. 
Similarly to public health-care services, public spending on education has a massive impact on 
income redistribution, when calculated on the basis of average costs per person enrolled in public 
educational institutions. In the middle of the 2000s, the contribution of public educational services to 
redistribution was 30% (Amar et al., 2008), because they absorb about 5% of French GDP and also 
because the monetary value of these in-kind transfers diminishes as household income rises. But 
redistribution is uneven depending on the type of educational service. Transfers related to pre-school 
(excluding nurseries) and primary education benefit most the least affluent households, which tend to be 
single-earner families with more children. But the value of in-kind benefits relating to secondary education 
increases for more wealthy households, given that children from these households opt more often for 
general secondary schools, at which attendance is longer and more costly than at vocational schools 
utilised by poorer families (Allègre et al., 2010). Finally, there is a U-shaped pattern for tertiary education 
because poor student households receive important financial aid and because the children of the most 
affluent households have a higher propensity to attend. 
Nevertheless, using current spending on education as a measure of income redistribution may be 
flawed if present differences in income are due to past expenditures on education. In any case, spending 
does not necessarily reflect the quality of education, which may vary a great deal across locations. Also, 
whether a given amount of public spending on education reduces or increases income inequality depends to 
a large extent on the returns to education: in fact, socio-economic background and social capital have a 
much larger impact than actual public spending (Allègre et al., 2010). Rather than incorporating the 
monetary value of public educational services into the definition of income, a more useful benchmark 
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would be to see the extent to which public education reduces the impact of parental socio-economic status 
on educational outcomes and future income and improves inter-generational social mobility. A related area 
is the training of employees, which costs up to 1.5% of GDP, financed partly by a tax levied on employers’ 
wage bill. It is not only a very complex system and of low quality but also magnifies inequality by 
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Annex 1. From individual wage dispersion to income inequality at the household level 
 
The starting point for determining disposable income at the household level is labour income at the 
individual level: this may differ because of different wage rates, differences in hours worked or because of 
the lack of labour earnings due to unemployment or inactivity. The next step is labour income at the 
household level, which depends on family size and composition. Household income is expressed in terms 
of consumption per standardised unit, which helps compare living standards per person. Households also 
receive capital income, which in combination with labour income gives household market income. What 
income remains at a household’s disposal (household disposable income) hinges upon the amounts 
received in cash transfers and paid in taxes. Households’ adjusted disposable income is their income after 
taxes and transfers adjusted for their consumption of public services (OECD, 2011a; Hoeller et al., 2012). 
Measuring the degree of redistribution 
The degree of income redistribution at any point in time can be measured by comparing the Gini 
coefficient, a measure of income inequality, for household market income (income before taxes and 
transfers) and for household disposable income (income after taxes and transfers). A standard way is to 
compute Gini coefficients based on households ranked according to their market income (Gini before taxes 
and transfers) and disposable income (Gini after taxes and transfers). Gini coefficients calculated for total 
population include old-age pensioners. Based on this measure, public pension benefits will show up as pure 
redistribution between younger and older people, given that pensioners’ market income will be zero, while 
their disposable income will equal pension benefits. If public pensions, including both contributions and 
benefits, are thought of as over-the-life cycle redistribution for individuals, including pensioners in the 
calculation may overstate overall income redistribution. One very rough way of attempting to correct for 
this problem is to calculate the Gini coefficient for market income using households re-ranked in 
accordance with disposable income. Nevertheless, public pension systems may contain strong 
instantaneous income redistribution in the presence of minimum pensions, unrelated to lifetime pension 
contributions, and generous special occupational pension schemes, or if the parameters of the system 
change over time. Another way of filtering out the effect of pension benefits is to calculate the Gini 
coefficient for the working-age population (15-64) alone. However, such Gini coefficients may not be fully 
comparable across countries if the average retirement age differs and thus the share of old-age pensioners 
in the population aged 15-64 years varies. 
How much income redistribution does the French tax and transfer system undertake? 
According to the dataset used in Joumard et al. (2012), in the mid-2000s income redistribution 
resulting from the tax and cash transfer system reduced the Gini coefficient (for working-age population) 
less than the OECD median. But the Gini coefficient was calculated by ranking households in accordance 
with their disposable income, including for the Gini coefficient on household market income. Yet the 
calculation for a new vintage of the data for the end-2000s shows a redistribution of 9 percentage points for 
France, against an OECD median of 7 percentage points. Income redistribution, obtained using household 
market income for households ranked by household market income, as used in this paper, was around 
14 percentage points (the median Gini decline was around 11 percentage points), both in the mid- and 
late 2000s. Overall, income redistribution is higher in France than in many other OECD countries. 
Source: Joumard, I., M. Pisu and D. Bloch (2012), “Less Income Inequality and More Growth – Are They Compatible? Part 3. Income 
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